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Abstract 
Secure web access has a remarkable growth. Users would like to exploit the advantages of the Internet 
for online banking, for e-commerce or they simply would like to protect their information e.g. with 
using a secure web mailer. Https is a simple hup traffic on top of a security protocol (e.g. S S L , 
T L S ) is used for serving this need. This paper gives detailed analysis of https traffic to aid traffic 
dimensioning or traffic modelling and even to assist investigation of traffic flow confidentiality. 
Keywords: https, S S L , T L S , traffic analysis, traffic flow confidentiality. 
1. Introduction 
The HTTP [5] has the largest traffic on the Internet. Users primarily surf on the 
Internet to collect public information. Hovewer, the number of the web-based com-
mercial services (e-commerce) or private accesses like e-banking rapidly grows. In 
addition, protection of letters using web-based e-mail services has also a vital ne-
cessity. These services require to protect communication between peers, moreover 
between users. 
Without protecting sensitive web traffic, an eavesdropper may deduce param-
eters or user behaviour, or an attacker can even identify and impersonate the victim. 
Therefore, several security solutions have evolved, the two most notable security 
protocols are the SSL [1] and the TLS [3], The two protocols are very similar. 
Before sending user information, the client and the server initially negotiate about 
the security association, including cryptographic algorithms and keys. After the 
handshake phase, protected traffic is transmitted. If a web server uses SSL or TLS, 
then the HTTP [4, 5] communication is secured. In this case the communication is 
called HTTPS[11], 
It is beneficial to have a model for https for bandwidth or for cost estimation. 
This is extremely important for communications that contain expensive links or 
the link capacity is limited and secure web access is required. An example can be 
when the subscribers use satellite terminals, GPRS or UMTS based equipment for 
browsing on the web. 
This paper introduces a methodology for modelling traffic characteristics of 
security protocols in Section 2. Based on this methodology, a traffic model for 
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https is presented. In Section 3 security, protocols of https are shown, Section 4 
introduces a generic https model. This model is used for-the characterisation of 
https traffic in Section 5. Section 6 concerns the user behaviour and the properties 
of transport and lower layers which can affect the shape of the https traffic. The 
traffic model is verified by measurements in Section 7. 
2. Methodology for Modelling Traffic Characteristics of Security Protocols 
Traffic characteristics of any communication protocol can be modelled easily, since 
the message format, length and behaviour are known from protocol specifications. 
However, time-dependence and options (ambiguously specified behaviour) in the 
specification can cause statistical properties of traffic characteristics. This kind of 
statistical properties still can be characterised by traffic measurements. Security 
protocols, unfortunately, lose the property of observability due to employment of 
data confidentiality, so from their traffic measurements one can hardly deduce sta-
tistical properties. Even most of the security protocols possess the ability of traffic 
flow confidentiality. This not only hides the actual value of data elements, but also 
the length and the place of information is concealed. In test envinronment, all in-
formation (e.g. secret material) is available for characterising a security protocol, 
however, its behaviour can be quite different than the real-time traffic. Furthermore, 
applied methodology in test environments for characterisation of real-time traffic 
is not manageable. Therefore it is impossible to find an accountable network ad-
ministrator (e.g. of an on-line bank) who agrees to disclose confidential information 
for characterisation. 
The following methodology tries to address this issue, it is recommended for 
investigation of real-time traffic without the need of any confidential information. 
It requires to know the behaviour of the security protocol, like message flow or 
where and how cryptographic algorithms, random padding lengths, or compression 
methods are used. 
Step 1: message attributes or variables (like port number, length field), used 
in all types of implementations, should be identified. 
Step 2: explore which cryptographic and compression algorithms might occur 
in the security protocol. 
Step 3: determine or estimate in what way a specific algorithm affects the 
message attributes or even the whole message (e.g. an MD5 [6] hash increases the 
length of message by 16 bytes). 
Step 4: determine the value of those attributes which do not depend on the 
various cryptographic and compression algorithms, but have either fixed length 
(e.g. Version) or have variable length (e.g. SP1). From the protocol specification 
or measurements, the probability density function of the attributes with variable 
length can be determined or estimated. 
Step 5: For those parameters, which depend on some cryptographic or com-
pression algorithms, determine the statistical properties (e.g. the probability of 
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occurrence) of a specific algorithm per message attributes. From the protocol spec-
ification or measurements (by tracing the list of offered and accepted ciphersuites) 
this probability can be determined. 
Step 6: with characterisation of upper and lower layer protocols, the effect 
to the security protocol can be determined. For example, an influence from upper 
layer is the user behaviour. From the lower layer propagation, buffering delays, 
and other network effects originate. Existing traffic models like HTTP, TCP source 
models can be used here. 
Step 7: Model statistical properties of communication, like interarrival time 
between messages, correlation, etc. 
Step 8: Simplify the model by neglecting infrequent messages or rare cipher-
suites, or approximating complex messages, and those lengths. 
Step 9: Evaluate the model to measurements and feed back the results. 
Chapter 4 addresses the first step, while the next four steps and Step 8 are 
covered in chapter 5. Step 6 is discussed in chapter 6, and the results are evaluated 
in chapter 7. 
3. Security Protocols for https 
Https can choose between three security protocols. However, the oldest one is the 
Secure Socket Layer version 2 (SSLv2) [2] which contains several security flaws, 
therefore this is extremely seldom used. Corrected version of this protocol, the 
Secure Socket Layer version 3.0 rapidly became de facto standard. Later the Internet 
Engineering Task Force (IETF) released an official standard, based on the SSLv3.0, 
which is called Transport Layer Security (TLS). The difference between the TLS 
and the SSLv3.0 is minimal: the number of ciphersuites, alert, and certificate types 
were extended, the method of key calculation was modified and the Handshake 
finalisation message was modified (simplified). The version numbering of TLS 
shows (version 3.1) that this protocol can be considered as the successor of SSLv3.0. 
Nowadays, secure hup communication prefers SSLv3.0, but the latest versions of 
applications start to use TLS only. 
Fig. 1 shows the SSL/TLS message flow. Messages with dashed lines are 
optional. Fig. 1(a) shows the full handshake message exchange. The SSL/TLS 
communication starts with the ClientHello messages, where the client sends several 
ciphersuites to initiate a session. The server selects one ciphersuite and answers with 
a ServerHello message; also certificate of the server and, optionally, if the selected 
ciphersuite requires, serverKey Ex change message is attached. If the server requires 
client certificate for authentication, then this is indicated in the ClientCertRequest 
message. Finally, the ServerHelloDone closes this communication. If a client 
certificate is requested, then the client attaches its certificate in the answer, also 
responds with Client Key Exchange, which contains the keying material. Certificate 
Verify notification may also be sent by the client. After negotiating and sending the 
keying material, secure communication should be started. The ChangeCipherSpec 
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message indicates, that the negotiated security procedures must be used right after 
this message. Therefore, the last message of the clieni, the Finished is encrypted. If 
the server receives the ClientKeyExchange, it starts to calculate secret keys. If this 
is finished, the server answers to the client with a ChangeCipherSpec message. The 
encrypted Finish message of the server closes the handshake. After the handshake 
phase, peers exchange encrypted user data. 
If both the server and the client support the Session Key Caching (SKC) 
mechanisms, then after the initial communication they can improve efficiency by 
reusing existing information. The reduced message flow is presented in Fig, 1(b). 
In the SSL/TLS protocol stack upper layer messages are encapsulated and 
protected in the lower SSL/TLS Record Layer. There are different methods to 
achieve confidentiality. Stream ciphers have the same length as the plaintext; block 
ciphers may have padding in order to fill the plaintext to block size of the ciphering 
algorithm. The padding can be up to 255 bytes in order to provide some data flow 
confidentiality too. Record Layer messages, furthermore, contain a generic header 
(which consists of Type, Version and Length fields) and a Message Authentication 
Code (MAC). 
Client Server 
HeUoBegy**1 _ -
Server 
Encrypted User Data 
Encrypted User Data 
(a) Full Handshake (b) Session Key Caching 
Fig. 1. The SSLH"LS message flow 
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4. General https Model 
We denote the user traffic by / ( / ) , let 9 (9 : Q i-v 9t) model the interarrival time 
of messages / ( / ) = msg(/)/(0 < t). is an indicator function, msg(r) is the 
content of the message at time t. 
Furthermore, let the encrypted user traffic be /*( / ) between the server and 
the client. The client can initiate multiple sessions, it starts with a handshake, 
therefore, in our model h(t) is the aggregate handshake traffic between the server 
and the client. The encrypted user traffic is equal to the user traffic fragmented, 
encapsulated and encrypted to SSL/TLS record layer: 
/* ( / ) = ^(RHeader + Enc(Compr (msg,(/)) + MAC {Compr jmsg^/) ) ) ) ) , 
tml 
where + is concatenation, Enc{.} means symmetric encryption, and msg,(/) is the 
i-th fragment of the message msg(/) = X]f = |(rnsg ((r)) such as N — | m y ~J and 
the <p is the size of SSL/TLS fragment. 
As SSL/TLS can handle both stream ciphers 5{.} and block ciphers B{.}: 
Enc{.) = 5 { . ] / a + 5 { . } / s , 
where lx indicator function (Iah — 0), its value is 1 if the specific cipher is used 
(otherwise zero). A short definition of block ciphers (let the H symbol be deduction, 
\x\ the length of message x in bytes and plaintext is a{t)): 
Mt) = B{a(t), key] 
= B{key,a(/) H> fo(t) \ Pr(/3B(/) h a(t)) 
= 0APr(^fl(Or-key) 
= OA 10,(01 > \a(t)\) 
and Stream ciphers: 
& ( / ) = ${«</), key} 
= B{key,a(t)r->Mt)\\<x(t)\ 
= |ft(f)| A PrGMO >-«(/)) 
= 0APr (^ (Or -key ) = 0) 
Compr{.) means compression: fic = Compr{a(r)} = [a(t) h-> /?<:(/) I \Pc(0\ < 
|af (/)|} The RHeader is the general SSL/TLS record layer header, it consists of 
the type, version and length fields. MAC{.) is the message authentication code 
calculation function, this is different in SSL and TLS, but the following definition 
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can be applied to both protocols (y(t) is an arbitrary b i t string): 
PMAC = MAC{a(t),key} 
= {key,a(t) ^ j8 M A C ( r ) | P r ( £ M A C ( 0 h Qf(/)) 
= OAPr(0MAc(Or-key) 
= 0 A (Pr(<*(r), key h y(t)) = 0 | j8 M A C ( f ) ^ y(/))} 
The generalised https model consists of the encrypted user application data and 
handshake traffic: 
HTTPS(r) = M O + / * ( ' ) • 
Consider | ( 0 = (&.) , a vector of probability variable | : £2 »-» 9f . The first 
element refers to the delay of X\ message arrived relative to a reference time, f ^ / i ' 7^  
1 are the probability variables of the interarrival times of message A., and A.,+ 1. 
If no session caching is used, then i' e [1..14] and 
(noSKo r^ = (HelloRequest, ClientHello, ServerHello, ServerCert, 
ServerKeyExchange, CertRequest, ServerHelloDone, ClientCert, 
ClientKeyExchange, ClientCertificateVerify, ClientChangeCipherSpec, 
ClientFinished, ServerChangeCipherSpec, ServerFinished). 
If Session caching is set i e [I..6] and 
( S K O ^ T _ (clientHello, ServerHello, ServerChangeCipherSpec, 
ServerFinished, ClientChangeCipherSpec, ClientFinished). 
The handshake traffic can be divided into client-to-server hc(t) and server-to-client 
hs(t) directions. (Fig. 1): 
MO = H (Mtfo < 0); hs(t) = ( V % < ')); 
where K$KC = {1.5,6} and L S K C — {2,3,4} at session reuse, and ^ n o sKC = 
{2, 8,9, 10, 11, 12} and L n o S K c = {1,3,4,5,6,7, 13, 14} when https not uses pre-
vious session information. h*Ai is the handshake message X,, / ( . ) is an indicator 
function, its value is set when the corresponding message is sent. 
4. J. Format of Handshake Messages 
In this Section the formal description of the handshake messages will be introduced. 
The RHeader is the general SSL/TLS record layer header, it consists of the type, 
version and length fields, while the HHeader is the general SSL/TLS handshake 
header, it contains the handshake type, and length fields. Ver is the version attribute 
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of the sender. Ix is a generic indicator function, its value is one if and only if 
message x exists, otherwise zero. 
The Record layer adds the record layer header to all upper layer protocol 
(handshake, application data) messages. If a message is supposed to be encrypted, 
then after fragmentation the * ( . ) = RHeader + Enc{Compr{.} + MAC{Compr{.}}} 
transformation is applied to it. HelloRequcsts consist only of the handshake layer 
header /ihdioRcq = HHeader. ClientHello contains HHeader, Ver, and a Rand ran-
dom data. 
c^iicnthciiofO = HHeader + Ver + Rand + CSessionID 
+CCipherSuites + Compression, 
Where CSessionID, CCipherSuites, Compression attributes arc the session ID of 
the client (variable length random ID), list of ciphersuites and list of compression 
methods offered by the client. In every implementation those fields additionally 
contain length fields even if this is not specified in the SSL/TLS standards. The 
server answers to the ClientHello message, choosing ciphersuite and compression 
method: 
/jse rvcrhciio(0 — HHeader + Ver + Rand + SScssionID 
-1-SCipherSuite + Compression 
The server certificate message contains a server specific certificate or certificate list. 
CertificatesLength indicates the length of the certificate, this variable is not in the 
SSL/TLS specification. 
hsccn(t) = HHeader + CertificatesLength + Cert Lis t(server) 
In the Server Key Exchange message, if RSA key transport is chosen in the ci-
phersuite. RSA parameters, if Diffie-Hellman key exchange is selected, then DH 
parameters are sent. The message should also contain a signature to authenticate 
the traffic: 
/iSKeyX Ch(0 = HHeader + Ver 4- / R S A RSA + /DHE-DH" + / S j gSig. 
where 
/ R S A ' D H E = 0. 
DH contains the Diffie-Hellmann public variables, g, n and Ys, RSA [7] contains 
the modulus and the exponent. /si g indicates whether a signature exists, Sig is a 
signature algorithm, specified in the SCipherSuite. If DSS [8] authentication exists, 
an SHA-1 [9] hash, if the signature is based on RSA, then an MD5+SHA1 hash is 
applied: 
Sig = / R S A ( M D 5 + SHA) + / D S S ( S H A ) 
The server can optionally ask for client certificate for mutual authentication. In 
this case, the known certificate types (ClientCertTypes) and the known certificate 
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authority names (CAname) are specified. In addition, implementations also con-
tain one byte long attribute for indicating the number of known certificate types 
(CertTypesCount). 
/'CenReqO = HHeader + CertTypesCount + ClientCertTypes + CAname. 
The ServerHelloDone consists of: 
fcsHeiioDone(0 = HHeader. 
Client certificate is similar to the server certificate message, however, it contains 
the Client certificate or certificate list: 
Accen(') = HHeader + CertificatesLength + CcrtList(client). 
Client Key exchange message: if RSA key transport is selected, it contains Version 
and random number encrypted by the public RSA key found in the certificate. If 
DH method is selected, the public DH value is attached: 
AcKeyXchf/) = HHeader + /R SA{Vcr + RND}RSA,,uh + / D H E > W 
The optional Client Certificate Verify message includes either DSS or RSA signa-
ture: 
/iciCertVerifytO = HHeader + /sigSig, 
The handshake phase is closed by the Finished message, generally this message is 
encrypted by the negotiated algorithms. This message contains verification data, 
which consists of 36 bytes in the case of SSL and 12 bytes in TLS. 
ft Finished (0 — HHeader + VerifyData. 
In SSL/TLS there are two additional non-handshake messages, the Alert and Change 
CipherSpec message. The former indicates warning or fatal error, while the latter 
indicates when the negotiated algorithms should be used. (Both can be in encrypted 
form): 
/'AieriO*) = AlertLcvel -I- AlertDescription 
and 
/iChCiPherSpec(0 = CipherSpecType. 
5. Modelled TVaffic Characteristics of https 
In this chapter Steps 2,3,4,5 and 8 of the methodology for modelling traffic charac-
teristic of security protocols are shown. 
O V E R H E A D ANALYSIS OF HTTPS 19 
5.1. Cryptographic Algorithms 
In the following, ciphers used in SSL/TLS implementations are shown: RSA is used 
for Authentication and Key transport, but also DH or DHE is used for key generation 
and DSS for authentication. For symmetric encryption 3DES, DES, RC4 and IDEA 
are used, and MD5 and SHA-1 for message integrity. 
Block size or output length of the used cryptographic algorithms are the fol-
lowing: MD5uses 16, SHA-1 uses 20 bytes. Block ciphering algorithms like DES, 
3DES, IDEA have 8 bytes block length, RSA generates as long ciphcrtext as the 
size of modulus [10] so 64, 128, 256 bytes (if the key length is 512, 1024, 2048 
bits). Output length of RC2, RC4 algorithms is the same as the length of the input 
plaintext. 
Size of the cryptographic parameters that can be sent between the client and 
the server are various. The modulus of RSA can be around 64, 128, 256 bytes 
(512, 1024, 2048 bits), however, the RSA exponent is usually 3 bytes. The length 
of Diffie-Hellmann generator is usually 1 byte, while the modulus and Ys typically 
have 64, 96, 128 bytes (512, 768, 1024 bits) length. A DSA signature (containing 
the r and the s) requires 40 bytes, while RSA signature requires at least 64 or 128 
bytes (if key length is 512, 1024 bits, respectively). 
5.2. Length of Message Variables 
Constant length variables of the SSL/TLS messages and their sizes are the follow-
ing: RHcader 5, HHeader 4, Ver 2, Rand 32, CertificatesLength 3, CertTypeCount, 
AlertLcvel, AlertDcsc, ChCipherSpecTypc and ComprMethod 1 byte. 
Variable length message attribute is only the client SessionlD data, whose 
length can be between 0 and 32 bytes, but in our measurement it is either 0 or 32. 
Variable length message attributes which depend on some security properties 
are the following. The CiphcrSuiteList variable of ClientHello contains between 
5 and 24 ciphersuite, however, in most cases 8 and 11 ciphersuites are sent to the 
server (one half of the samples contained 11 and one quarter of the samples had 8 
ciphersuites). Since one ciphersuite consumes 2 bytes, the length of Ciphersuite 
variable can be modelled as: ?r(x < 0.5)22 + Pr(0.5 < x < 0.75)16 + Pr(x > 
0.75) Unif(10,48). 
The length of the server and the client certificate depends on several param-
eters, for example the number of X.509 extensions and signature algorithm. In 
addition, the length of certificate depends on the length of the bounded public key 
and signature. Public keys used on the Internet have 512, 1024 or 2048 bits length, 
however, the latter is not typical yet. Therefore the length of the Certificate payload 
is modelled as a uniform distribution between 600 and 1000 bytes. 
The RSA public modulus has the same length as the key size, so it can be 64, 
128 bytes. The RSA public exponent usually has a 3-bytes-iength. Diffie-Hellman 
generator is usually 1 byte, while the modulus and Y, can be 64, 96, 128 bytes. 
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The length of Signature data (Sig) can be 0, (in the case of no signature) 40, (if the 
signature algorithm is DSS) or 64, 128 (in the case of 512 or 1024 bits length RSA) 
bytes. 
The Client CertTypesCount in the Certificate Request can be between 1 and 
255 bytes, but in our measurement this is between 30 and 200. Therefore let the 
length of ClientCertTypes be modelled as uniform distribution between 30 and 200 
bytes. 
The RSA encrypted message attribute in the Client Key Exchange message 
({Ver + RND}RSAput)) has the same length as the RSA modulus size so 64 or 128 
bytes. In the Finished message, the Verification data is either 36 bytes, i f SSL is 
used, or 12 bytes in the case of TLS. 
5.3. Length of Messages 
The traffic characteristic of https can be defined using the generalised https model: 
|HTTPS(<)i = |MOI + l /*(OI, 
Handshake messages can be divided into client and server communication, 
\h(t)\ = \hc(0\ + \hs(0\, 
where 
I M 0 I = £ ( | A a ( - | / & ( - <')); 
iei. 
Let (j>{i) -- (4>K), 0 f ' ' :• m # probability variable for the length of the hi 
message. In this case the handshake traffic length: 
I M O I = < / ) ) ; 
icK 
Furthermore, let the probability density function of : fx, (x). Suppose that /% (x) 
is time invariant. Note that if fK.(x) and the distribution of is known, then the 
handshake traffic can be modelled. In the following, several models for <f>k. (x) and 
for its distribution are presented, while models for /%(-*) are discussed in chapter 
7.2. 
The length of Record and Handshake layer header is fixed, 5 and 4 bytes, 
respectively (|RHeader| = 5, |HHeader| = 4 ) . Let notation ({a, b, c}) be a specific 
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distribution between the set of a, b and c. The general model of Table 1 shows the 
length of handshake messages using parameter estimation from Section 5.2. 
Record layer encryption is used to protect user data, finish and alert messages. 
N 
\f*{t)\ = J2 (IRHeaderl + \B{payload}\lB + |5{payload)j/5), 
where the payload before encryption: 
payload = ComprfmsgifO} 4- MAC{Compr{msg,(r)}}. 
The MAC algorithm is calculated as the outmost function is a hash. Therefore 
the length of MAC depends on the hash algorithms: |MAC{.]| = / M A C 0 6 / M D 5 + 
20/.SHA) The block ciphered data length: 
|tf {payload}! = IComprfmsg^fOll + |MAC{Compr{msg,(0}}| + |Padding|. 
Let the block length be ft bit. If the communication uses no traffic flow confiden-
tiality (so the padding fills out only the last block), then the padding length can be 
modelled as a uniform distribution: [Paddingl = UniffO, ft/8). Otherwise, i f traffic 
flow confidentiality is set, then the padding can fill at least the last data block, but 
its length can reach 255 bytes: 
/' • blocksize + UniffO, ft/8) < 255, where i is a probability variable, such 
i € N and its minimal value is UnivfO, ft/8) and maximal value is 255. The 
distribution of this probability variable can be modelled with uniform distribution 
/ = Unif(Unif(0, ft/8), 255). 
For example, block ciphers with block size of 64 bits and with no traffic flow 
confidentality, |Padding| = UniffO, 8). This is the common case in our measure-
ments. • 
The stream ciphered data length: 
|£{payload}| - |Compr{msg,(0)l + |MAC{Compr(msg ({/)}}|. 
5.4. Simplifications in the Model 
In the First refinement model we made several improvements to adjust our model 
to the common properties of the implementations. Therefore the size of the Client 
Hello and ServerHello message is increased by four and one, respectively. The 
implementations use extra length fields in those messages. The Certificate of the 
client and the server is modelled by a uniform distribution between 600 and 1000 
bytes, because the length of all the certificates was between those values. 
The Second refinement model contains simplifications of various algorithms. 
In all measurements no compression is used by implementations, so 
|Compr{/<0}| = 1/(01-
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In our measurements RSA_RC4_128_MD5 was the most frequently used cipher-
suite (89.5%), in most implementations it is included, and it has the highest prefer-
ence. Occurrence of RSA_RC4_56_MD5 is 1.7%, RSA_RC4_128_SHA is 0.35%, 
RSA_RC4_56_SHA is 8.2%. The remaining block ciphers, (like DHE_RSA_3 
DES_SHA) are used only in 0.25% of the samples. Therefore we can conclude that 
in our measurements the stream ciphers have dominance (99.75%), therefore let us 
simplify our model as IB = 0, is = 1. 
In most cases (99.8%) RSA is used, so let us simplify our model further, as 
/RSA == 1. foss = 0. / D H = 0, / D H E — 0. From the RSA ciphersuites 1.8% was 
RSA_EXPORT (with 512 bits), 8.2% was RSA_EXPORT_1024 (with 1024 bits) 
and 90% of the ciphersuites was RSA with no limitation. However, unlimited RSA 
ciphers used only 1024 bits, therefore the 1024-bit-long RSA had the dominance 
(98.2%). SHA algorithm is used in 8.8% of the https connection, while MD5 is 
commonly used 91.2%. All communication used integrity check, so / M A C — 
SSL is used in 52% of the https traffic (TLS is used in 48% of communication). 
Therefore we simplify that the length of finished message is (with 50% probability) 
either 45 or 21 bytes. In ServerKeyExchange and in ClientVerify messages SHA 
signature is used. 
The SessionID in the ClientHello is set when an SSL/TLS session has been 
set up previously, and no new SSL/TLS connection is forced. Therefore the usage 
of SessionID is set the case of session caching. 
The modified length of handshake messages can be found in Table I. 
Note that the calculation of the record layer length is simplified (N = | m s | ( " 1 " j ) : 
]/*(01 - ( l R H e a d e r l + Imsg((0l + /MD 5 |MAC{msg,(0l}) 
= 53 (|RHeader| + /MD5lMAC{msg ;(/)|}) + | / ( f } | = 21/V + | / ( 0 I -
In the Third refinement model unfrequent messages (with an occurrence under 0.5%) 
are removed (Table J). Since all optional handshake messages are removed, only 
the ClientHello, ServerHello, SCert, SHelloDone, ClKeyExchange, ChCipherSpec, 
Finished messages remain. 
The Session Key Caching technique requires less messages, the length of those 
messages can be found in Table J. 
6. Behaviour of User and Network 
The nature of the https traffic highly depends on user behaviour. However, https 
services, like Internet banking, e-commerce, secure mailing, etc. delimit the be-
haviour of the user. Therefore three different types of secure http service can be 
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easily separated. In the first type the user interactively uses the service, reads and 
fills https forms and sends them back (e.g. a questionnaire). In the second type the 
user primarily reads information, and seldom sends data (e.g. querying an on-line 
bank). The third type of secure web service is a secure mailer, where the user reads 
and sends mails. In this case the user can attach a large file for uploading, or the 
user may also download large files. 
The user-generated traffic is correlated to the handshake traffic. Every new 
standalone HTTP object download precedes a new handshake message flow. 
The secure layer opens a new secure connection for each new object. There-
fore i f the session caching is not set, then the https traffic: 
^objects N 
HTTPS ( ? ) = £ X! (* N °SKC, - . , (0 
+RHeader,-; + msg,.,(r) + padding,-; + MAC,-,;). 
In session key caching is used, the download of the first object uses full handshake 
(because there is no preceding shared knowledge), however further objects use 
session caching mechanisms: 
N 
HTTPS(/) = / i n o S K C i ( ' ) + ^(RHeader; + msg,- ,(f) + padding,- r + M A C U 
ffobjccts N 
+ £ 12 ( * i » U / W + RHeader,,+ ms$. /0 + padding^- + MAC,, ,) . 
j=2 r=1 
The network also can distort the traffic shape of https; buffering delays, network 
congestion, the state of TCP (e.g. in slow start), propagation delays may cause 
significant deviations. 
However, in our study the delay is corrected by the actual RTT. Therefore 
effects from the network layer can be ignored. 
7. Results 
Our measurements have been performed in two scenarios. In the first configuration 
we monitored a 100 Mbps backbone line. The second measurement was collected 
on the 10 Mbps network segments where https server was located. In both scenarios 
we monitored real https traffic, which sent on TCP port 443. In the first configu-
ration more than 120000, while in the second configuration more than 20000 https 
communications (containing handshake and user data traffic) were collected. 
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(a) Server Hello messages, No S K C (b) Server Finished messages. No S K C 
(c) Server Hello messages, S K C (d) Finished messages, S K C 
Fig. 2. Empirical distributions of interarrival times 
7.1. Length of HS Messages 
We have four methods to estimate the length of handshake messages. The first one 
is originated from the general traffic characteristics in Section 5.3. In this model 
there are several unresolved variables that the first refinement model resolves. This 
might give a rough estimation, but i f it is not sufficient enough, then the second 
refinement model can be used, where the unfrequent variables are removed. In the 
third refinement model unfrequent messages are also neglected. The SKC model 
can only be used for connections using session key caching mechanism (Table 1). 
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Table I . Length of handshake messages. * length includes the Record layer encapsulation 
Handshake 
messages 
(*,) 
Empirical general model fo. 
refinement 
model 1 
refine-
ment 
model2 
retinc-
mcnt 
modcl3 
SKC 
Hello Req* 9 9 - 9 - -
ClientHello' 
p = 0.5 : 102 
p = 0.25 : 96 
p = 0.25 : 
Unif(45. 110) 
44 + 3 2 / s e s s i o n I D 
+2(#Ciphcrsuite) 
48 + 32/SKC 
+2((8.U)) 
(f96. 102)) {{96, 102)) ({96. 102)) 
Server Hello 74 73 74 74 74 74 
Server Cert Unif(600,1000) <kcr\ =&ert (server) 
12+ 
Unif(600. 1000) 
806 806 -
ScrverKeyEx-
change 
210 
"1 + ^ ( 3 
+((64. 128}))+ 
/DHEU 
+2(164,96. 128))) 
+ >Sig«(40. 
64, 128))) 
- 180 - -
S Hello Done 4 4 - 4 4 -
Client Cert Unir(600,1000) ^ceri 
= <Pcea<.cIient) 
12+ 
Unif(600, 1000) 
806 806 -
Client Key Ex-
change 
127 
+({64. 128))) 
+IDHEV 
+ ((64.96. 128))) 
- 140 140 -
Cert Verify 37 9 +/Sig ((40 
.64. 128)) 
49 - -
ChCipherS' (> 6 - 6 6 6 
Finished* ((45.21}) 9 + ((36. 12)) - ((45.21)) - -Alert* 7 7 - 7 7 7 
Encrypted 
Finished* 
p = 0.067: 37 
p = 0.015: 41 
p = 0.869: 61 
p = 0.047: 65 
(21.45) 
+Unif(0. 8) 
+ |MAC| 
- ((37,41. 61,65)) ({37,41, 61.65)) 61 
Encrypted 
Alert* 
p = 0.802 : 23 
p = 0.191; 27 
7 + Unif(0. 8) 
+|MAC| - 23 23 23 
Record Layer - |Compr(msg,(/))| +Unif(Unif(0. 8). 255) 
+|MACfCompr(ms&(/)))| 
21 + 21 + | / ( / ) | NA 
7.2. Time Dependence 
The lower layer of the SSL/TLS protocols optimises the handshake performance by 
grouping successive handshake messages. The empirical density of the interarrival 
times of the grouped messages are shown in Fig. 2. The distortion caused by network 
is corrected by the actual RTT, furthermore the data was collected in the second 
scenario, in the same LAN where the server resides. Fig. 2(a) demonstrates that 
the server immediately (2-3 ms) responds to ClientHello. In some cases, however. 
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the server looks up its database for the client. This causes an extra delay (60 ms) 
which is significant in the case of session caching Fig. 2(c). 
The delay between the two finished messages (20 ms) in non-session key 
caching case (Fig. 2(b)) is significant compared to the session caching case. The 
cause of this difference can be found in the key agreement mechanisms, since 
the server processes the CPU intensive ClientKeyExchange message, while in the 
session key caching case this step is replaced by a faster one. 
Note that the empirical probability density functions can be used for estimating 
the density function of . 
7.3. Overhead of https 
Handshake overhead 
The handshake overhead is defined as the ratio of the handshake and the total 
traffic of a connection. 
n m \ 
R h a n d s h a k e — \h(t)\ + | / * ( 0 | 
\h(t)\ 
\h(t)\ + NORHeadl + |padding| + |MAC(/(f)) | ) + 1/(01 
= l/KOI 
\h(t)\ + N(jRHead| + |padding| + |MAC(/( /)) | ) + N<p - v ' 
where v = 0..(<p — 1). 
The maximal value of handshake overhead (when no padding, MAC): 
^ h a n d s a k e M A X 
\h(t)\ \h(t)\ 
\h(t)\ + 5N + | / ( 0 I l /KOI+6 
when N = 1, v = (p — 1. The minimal value of the handshake overhead (block 
cipher with 64 blocklength, SHA): 
wm = 1^ (01 
h a n d s a k e M , N + | / { f ) | + 33^ + ^ 3 3 + 
The most possible overhead value (the ciphersuite TLS_RSA_RC4_MD5): 
\h(t)\ \h(t)\ 
andsake 
|/i(0l + i / ( 0 l + 21N \h(t)\ + N(2\ + ^ ) - v 
Table 2 shows the maximal and minimal values of handshake communication using 
the models in Table 1. 
Fig. 3 shows how the handshake ratio depends on the user traffic. The dotted 
and dashed lines are the minimal and maximal borderlines of the handshake ratio. 
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Table 2. Length of handshake messages and overhead. * for 1 kbyte user data 
Session Caching Non Session Caching 
Handshake Min Max Typical Min Max Typical 
(raffle 
Client to 125 261 169 159 369 264 
Server 
Serverlo 122 150 146 131 +cert 369 + cert 155 + cert 
Client 
Overhead 
Client to 
Server 
125 0.9775 0.1392* 159 0.984 0.201* 125+^33+p) 
Server to 
Client 
122 0.9615 0.1225* 131+cert 1-6 1-1045 * 122+Af{33+(0) l31+cert+//(33+«>) 375+cert 1200+cert 
(a) No session caching (b) Session Caching 
Fig. 3. Handshake ratio (empirical) 
In Fig. 3(a) the server to client and the opposite direction of handshake ratio are rep-
resented. Fig. 3(b) proves that even the ciphersuite list affects the handshake ratio, 
in the figure the ClientHello contained 3,5,6,8,11 ciphersuites, thus the handshake 
ratio increases. 
Cost for security 
The traffic cost for securing http is defined as the ratio of the sum of the 
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SSL/TLS control messages, record layer overhead and the user traffic. 
_ \k(r)\ + A/(|RHead| + |MAC(/(Q)| + Ipaddingl) 
n ~ 1/(01 
_ IMOI + A/(|RHead| + |MAC(/(Q)| + Ipaddingl) 
N(p — v 
The minimal cost line (when there is no padding and no MAC). 
_ \hmin(t)\ 5 
N(p <p 
The maximal cost line (blockcipher, SHA MAC, etc.) 
| A ( f ) m a x | + 33jV 
Irnax = T ^ y j = I « U W | + 33. 
It is obvious that the cost function depends on the user traffic. If the user can 
estimate the amount of traffic he sends , the additional network traffic can be deter-
mined. Therefore this information can be the basis of the network dimensioning, 
or bandwidth estimation. 
8. Conclusion 
Https model can be used not only for describing secure web traffic, but it can be 
used for characterisation of secure IMAP, and secure POP3 [12] also. User traffic 
and network congestion can distort the shape of https, however, the user behaviour 
is determined by the secure service. In this paper a general https model, and an 
exact traffic model together with simplified traffic models are introduced. 
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